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Abstract
Our ability to understand and think about the mental states of other people is referred to as 
“mentalizing” or “theory of mind”. It features prominently in all social behavior, is essential for 
maintaining relationships, and shows pronounced individual differences. Here we review new 
approaches to study the underlying psychological mechanisms and discuss how they could best be 
investigated using modern tools from social neuroscience. We list key desiderata for the field, such 
as validity, specificity, and reproducibility, and link them to specific recommendations for the 
future. We also discuss new computational modeling approaches, and the application to 
psychopathology.
1. Introduction
Theory of mind (ToM), or mentalizing, refers to our ability to infer the hidden mental states 
of other people, such as their beliefs, intentions, and feelings. Mentalizing can be thought of 
as a specific kind of causal inference: inferring mental states that explain and predict 
people’s behavior. The term “theory of mind” was initially coined as a term in connection 
with the question of whether chimpanzees might also have this ability [1, 2], but the field 
that provided most of the early empirical studies was developmental psychology. Studies in 
healthy children showed that explicit explanations and predictions related to the ability to 
understand other minds emerge around age four [3], although sensitivity to others’ false 
beliefs may occur even earlier [4]. Atypical mentalizing has been suggested to lie at the core 
of social difficulties in autism, where its developmental emergence is notably delayed [5]. 
These findings fueled hypotheses about the cognitive and perceptual processes that might 
enable mentalizing in development [6], and about the social skills that it in turn enables, 
such as pretend play [7]. Across fields, challenges in research on this topic concern i) how to 
adequately measure behavioral nuances and quantify related neural substrates (measurement 
validity and precision), ii) how to approximate real life functioning in the laboratory 
(generalizability) and iii) how to inform psychopathology and personalized medicine 
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(translational relevance). In this review, we provide recommendations for how best to make 
progress on these challenges, by enumerating a list of specific desiderata and how to achieve 
them.
2. List of desiderata
Validity
Mentalizing is nowadays tested with a variety of tasks ranging from the classic false belief 
attribution to social animations, rational action and strategic games [8]. While the choice of 
assessment depends highly on the research question and sample (animal, human, adult, 
infant), face, convergent, and discriminative validity are essential to build into all tasks that 
assess mentalizing. Since the term, “mentalizing,” is heterogeneously applied to begin with 
[8], tasks should be precise about what aspect of “mentalizing” or “ToM” they are supposed 
to measure (Implicit/explicit? Lexical or not? Representation or reasoning?). Ideally, there 
will be multiple tasks that can be used to converge on a putative aspect of this construct. 
Finally, tasks that do not require the inference of mental states, but that could be solved 
through associations between particular features and words (such as most tasks of emotion 
recognition, including the well-known “Mind in the Eyes” task [9] should not be taken as 
unambiguous markers of mentalizing without further evidence (see [10] for further 
discussion).
Studies in apes and young children are particularly challenging in their validity, because 
participants cannot be clearly instructed in the same way that adult humans can. Since 
posing the initial question [2] almost 40 years ago, a recent study in chimpanzees [**11] 
capitalized on a dependent measure also used with infants: preferential looking assessed 
with eyetracking. That study argued that great apes are indeed able to represent certain 
aspects of false beliefs. Yet there continues to be debate about whether or not nonhuman 
animals have ToM [12]. They certainly have the ability to predict aspects of another animal’s 
(or person’s) behavior. However, whereas adult humans can do so using relational 
representations that explicitly describe another’s mental state as decoupled from the state of 
the world, nonhuman animals may instead use a collection of other strategies. It has been 
argued that nonhuman primates use “awareness relations”, which flexibly represent what 
another individual is seeing or hearing [13]. While awareness relations provide considerable 
power in predicting behavior, they do not yet enable nonhuman animals to actively 
manipulate behavior. There is no good experimental evidence in animals yet of deception 
with the intent to cause a false belief, a behavior ubiquitous in humans.
Neuroscience studies may help resolve some of the unanswered questions, since they can 
provide independent evidence for shared or dissociable processes (see Methodological 
Advances). For example, a recent experiment found that certain brain regions within the 
parietal and frontal lobes of the macaque brain, including parts of the dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex (dMPFC; a region known to be involved in human mentalizing), were exclusively 
devoted to processing social interactions (but not object interactions) [**14]. A closely 
related study in human adults suggested a sensitivity to social interactions (but not the mere 
presence of two agents) within the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) [*15], a 
higher-order visual cortex region known to process biological motion. Given the accrual of 
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fine-grained neuroimaging data, comparisons across studies can now provide some 
differentiation of processes involved in mentalizing. It would be extremely valuable to 
obtain high-resolution neuroimaging data during social tasks in great apes, but so far this has 
been impossible for ethical and methodological reasons.
Specificity
There is general consensus for certain “social brain regions” involved in mentalizing [16–
18]: bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), precuneus (PC) and medial prefrontal cortex 
(MPFC). Several meta-analyses (e.g.,) have suggested that parts of this ‘core’ network are 
generally involved in mental state inferences, regardless of the task and stimulus formats. 
There remains a debate concerning the “specialization” of the mentalizing process, or its 
neural substrate. Perhaps consistent with early theoretical views that ToM arose as a form of 
social intelligence [2], some neuroimaging studies show considerable neural overlap 
between theory of mind, perspective taking [19], episodic memory and mental time travel 
[20]. A large part of the debate about the domain-specificity of mentalizing has centered on 
neuroimaging studies of the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and dmPFC. The TPJ has been 
highlighted as selectively activated when we think about other people’s beliefs [21], and the 
most widely used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) localizer task for 
mentalizing uses an explicit lexical task requiring decisions about false beliefs-- and most 
selectively activates the TPJ [18, 22]. The specificity of the dMPFC in mentalizing remains 
debated [23, 24]: findings of amodal representations of emotional information in this region 
[25, 26] suggest a more general role in social cognition. Debates about whether these regions 
are specifically activated for ToM, or instead also subserve other functions [27, 28], will 
continue to be informed by better spatial resolution. Subregions, or neuronal subpopulations, 
can be anatomically indistinguishable, and their processes thus conflated, when using 
standard fMRI, even though they may well subserve different specialized functions [29–31]. 
It may also be advantageous to use functional localizer tasks that activate specific brain 
regions in individual subjects, rather than groups [32, 33] or to capitalize on new 
developments for aligning brains in group analyses on the basis of individual-level 
functional information [34, 35]. All of these developments should help provide better 
specificity of function through better anatomical precision.
Variability and individual differences
There are substantial individual differences in mentalizing abilities across adult individuals. 
Behavioral tasks in the laboratory often fail to incorporate this fact: few tasks show sufficient 
range in behavioral performance (but see, e.g.[36]). This poses a challenge how best to 
design neuroimaging experiments to capture the variability and explain individual 
differences in underlying neural responses. It further implies that group-level analyses need 
to be interpreted with caution, since they may reflect a heterogeneous mix of processes. 
Improvements are being made with the rapid development of more sensitive fMRI measures, 
as well as group analysis approaches that preserve individual functional differences [33–35], 
so that analyses can indeed be undertaken at the individual level.
The debate about the developmental trajectory of mentalizing abilities in children further 
underlines the importance to investigate individual differences. A comprehensive study in a 
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large sample of children and adults found functionally distinct mentalizing network 
responses already in 3-year-old children, i.e. before systematically passing explicit false 
belief task [37]. Older children also showed increased network specialization, overall 
arguing for a slow and continuous development of mentalizing.
Having sufficient statistical power even to detect individual differences is often a challenge. 
The typical sample sizes of neuroimaging studies (n < 30), for instance, rarely have 
sufficient power to capture reliable individual variability in functional MRI data. This could 
be partially addressed by future approaches that accrue large sets of publicly available fMRI 
data during metalizing tasks (see next section).
Methodological advances and reproducibility
Statistical reliability and reproducibility have received considerable attention recently in 
psychology and neuroscience in general [38]. Two recent examples of comprehensive 
replication studies investigated crucial psychological aspects of infant mentalizing [**39, 
40]. General recommendations for increased reproducibility of fMRI research [**41] also 
apply to the neural mechanisms underlying mentalizing. Especially noteworthy in this 
context are new developments towards consistent preprocessing (e.g., fmriprep), data quality 
assessment (e.g., mriqc) and analyses (e.g., openneuro). Advances in imaging techniques, 
analyses, and atlases can further provide greater sensitivity and anatomical specificity. For 
instance, multi-echo fMRI together with independent components analysis has been reported 
to increase effect sizes in neuroimaging studies of mentalizing [42]. Atlases of subcortical 
structures crucial for social cognition, like the amygdala, can allow better distinction of 
activations within subnuclei [43, 44].
Multivariate analyses of fMRI data are now regularly used to identify specific 
representations of ToM, capitalizing on developments in machine learning algorithms. In 
these approaches, sensitivity to relative differences across spatial patterns of neural activity, 
rather than levels of mean activation, can improve the detection of mentalizing processes in 
general, as well as similarities and differences between individuals, groups [45, 46] and even 
species [47].
Finally, we suggest two additionally ingredients: 1) frequent pre-registration of all studies 
(which could be partial pre-registration), and 2) the accrual of data from mentalizing tasks 
into public shared databases.
Computational modeling
Recently, several computational models have been proposed for aspects of mentalizing, 
comprising predictive coding accounts [48, 49], learning models [50] or Bayesian-based 
inferences [**51, 52] (see Box for details on different approaches). These approaches 
connect with a large body of work using similar computational models in perception and 
decision-making. Formalizing psychological processes as computations may help to shed 
further light on the causal links between mentalizing, our own thoughts, and our social 
behavior. Assumptions and predictions about others’ actions, plans, habits, desires, beliefs 
and ever-changing experience with the world have to be constantly updated and integrated. 
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A challenge common to most of these approaches is how to specifically connect the specific 
computations within the model to real neural computations.
BOX
Computational approaches to mentalizing
Game theory of mind models inferences of another agent’s beliefs and goals to optimize 
our own behavior in mutual interactions. Here, goals represent different strategies, for 
instance operationalized within a social hunting game of two players [68]. These 
strategies are described as value-functions that take into consideration not only one’s own 
behavior, but also that of another person. This in turn introduces different depths of 
recursion, which can be treated as ‘levels of sophistication’ that each person has for 
thinking about what somebody else is thinking about [68]. In one study, individuals with 
autism showed difficulties inferring others’ strategies [69], affecting their own optimal 
behavior in a game context. A different study, however, found no such strategic 
impairments during an economic game in autism [70].
Predictive coding accounts apply a theoretical framework from sensory perception to 
specific abstract mentalizing processes. Generally, predictive coding assumes that a 
response to a certain stimulus contains not only information about the stimulus itself, but 
additionally about the difference between the predicted state (or its value) and the actual 
state of the world. In other words, neural systems make forward predictions about 
expected information. Thus, predictions about others’ intentions can be made, for 
instance, based on previous actions, group membership or personality aspects [48, 49]. 
Following this logic, activation in brain regions involved in ToM would be higher for 
unpredicted vs predicted mental states [71, 72].
Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) models aspects of ToM as Bayesian inference [51], by 
combining a generative model with a hypothesis space of possible mental states, and a 
prior over these hypotheses. The ‘prior’ represents the presumed probability of certain 
beliefs/desires, and the task then is to infer the posterior probability of unobservable 
mental states given our observations of behavior, an estimate that is continuously 
updated. Integrating and formalizing concepts of emotions within a Bayesian framework 
of ToM has recently used representational similarity analyses to link behavioral and 
neural data [*73].
Possible applications
BToM [51] attempts to “reverse engineer” others’ mental state inferences (inspired by 
computational accounts of vision). It could be extended to more complex environments 
(than the ones tested so far) and has been applied to computations underlying mental state 
inferences in preverbal infants [74]. The predictive coding account holds promise for 
investigating psychopathology of social difficulties related to ToM: Autism has recently 
been hypothesized to reflect general as well as specific impairments in the ability to make 
predictions [75]. Both the predictive coding and BToM accounts also offer the challenge 
of how to account for the prior hypotheses in the first place, a relatively neglected domain 
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of study that will presumably bring us back to evolutionary considerations and 
comparative studies.
While there are differences in theoretical and mechanistic formalization between the various 
computational approaches, they together may offer a decisive step forward in trying to parse 
aspects of mentalizing into quantifiable (and predictable) components on the behavioral and 
neural level.
Applicability to psychopathology
Multiple psychiatric disorders show compromised mentalizing abilities (e.g. Borderline 
Personality Disorder [53], Schizophrenia [54] and autism [6]). General commonalities and 
specific differences in mentalizing across disorders are yet to be established. A first step will 
be to obtain a more comprehensive inventory of behavioral abnormalities across multiple 
tasks. For instance, adults with autism show difficulties in learning from social rewards 
(compared to monetary rewards) [55], show reduced social preferences when donating to 
charities [55], and are relatively insensitive to the presence of other people on tasks where 
others’ opinions usually influence performance [56]. By contrast, the ability to perceive and 
extract emotional information from facial expressions [57, 58], animated social events and 
strategic levels of inference in competitive economic games [59] appear largely normal in 
the laboratory, even when manipulating the task relevance of social information [46]. 
Similarly, fMRI studies have found normal activation of the TPJ in autism during standard 
false-belief tasks [60], but atypical behavior when these are combined with inferences about 
moral responsibility [61].
These findings emphasize the need to carefully operationalize and reproducibly measure 
social abilities in general, and mentalizing in particular. Most useful for the field would be a 
standardized battery of lexical and nonlexical tasks that probe different aspects and uses of 
mentalizing. For instance, it would be valuable to use more naturalistic stimulus material 
[62, 63] in combination with tasks more closely approximating real life challenges (e.g., by 
adding temporal contingency [*59, 64] or an interaction component [65]).
Future Directions
Mentalizing tends to co-occur with other abilities into which it is sometimes decomposed. 
Which of these other abilities should be considered necessary components? Is there a causal 
relationship between mentalizing and these other abilities that we can elucidate (either 
phylogenetically, ontogenetically, or in ongoing cognition)? These are difficult questions 
since many perceptual and cognitive operations come into play during any actual realization 
of mentalizing (depending on the particular task used to assess it). It is difficult to 
disentangle which of these are mere enabling constraints and which are true components of 
the causal mechanisms behind mentalizing. Recent computational modeling approaches (see 
Box) together with advances in imaging methodology may help shed light on this question.
It would be important to obtain a broader inventory of which abilities correlate (and which 
do not) across behavioral as well as neural measures, just in healthy adults. For instance, 
while joint attention and mentalizing abilities appear to be highly correlated in infants, these 
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two abilities may not be correlated in adults [66] and are subserved by different neural 
substrates [67]. In the future, mentalizing will likely be parsed into more precise underlying 
psychological and neural computations that together comprise our theory of mind.
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• Human social behavior requires understanding and thinking about other 
minds (mentalizing)
• Despite a large body of research across psychology and neuroscience, 
research on mentalizing faces challenges in validity, specificity and 
reproducibility
• We lay out desiderata and make recommendations for the field
• We review recent computational modeling approaches to mentalizing
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Figure 1. Summary of recommendations
Theoretical considerations should ensure construct validity and relevance to real-life social 
cognition. The Design should carefully operationalize mentalizing (ideally across multiple 
tasks or be precise in what narrower aspect is being investigated). During Data Acquisition 
& analyses, computational approaches can be beneficial to formalize psychological 
processes. Advances in analyses tools (e.g. multivariate methods) are best combined with 
analyses of high functional and anatomical sensitivity. The Interpretation should include a 
critical reflection on causal relationships between all specific and domain-general abilities, 
and on the generalizability of the results. Submitting data and specific methods to public 
databases (e.g., OSF, OpenfMRI) is important for reproducibility. Finally, the outcome of 
one scientific project should in turn fuel the next (building a cumulative science).
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